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POINTS OF LAW AND FACT OVERLOOKED OR 
MISAPPREHENDED BY THE COURT 
 
 Pursuant to Fed. R. App. P. 40, plaintiffs/appellees respectfully move 
for rehearing by the panel on the grounds that the panel majority erred as a 
matter of fact and law.  More specifically, the majority erred in analyzing the 
chemical structure of the patented genes and gene fragments without 
considering (1) that the language of the patents defines the function, not the 
structure of the patented genes and gene fragments; (2) that gene fragments 
with the altered chemical structure identified by the Court exist in nature.  
The panel also erred in denying standing to two other plaintiffs, both of 
whom have standing under the panel’s own standard and that of the Supreme 
Court. 
ARGUMENT 
I.  THE COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO CONSIDER WHETHER THE 
DNA FRAGMENTS CLAIMED IN THESE PATENTS ARE PRODUCTS 
OF NATURE. 
 
 The opinion of the Court (authored by Judge Lourie) and the 
concurrence (by Judge Moore) both carefully analyzed the chemical 
structure of DNA and concluded that fragments of a chromosome are 
different chemicals from whole chromosomes and therefore patentable.  
However, the dispositive legal question in this case is not whether a 
fragment of DNA is a different chemical from a full chromosome of DNA 
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but whether the fragments claimed in the patents by Myriad are products of 
nature.  In concluding that the fragments are not products of nature because 
they are “markedly different” from what exists in nature, Ct. Op. at 41, the 
majority (Judges Lourie and Moore) relied on facts not in the evidentiary 
record and failed to consider other, relevant facts clearly establishing that the 
claimed fragments are products of nature as a matter of both fact and law. 
 The opinion for the Court upheld the patenting of human genes on the 
ground that the process of isolation of a gene inevitably requires the 
breaking of a covalent bond which creates a “portion of a native DNA 
molecule” that is chemically different from a “naturally occurring DNA 
molecule.”  Ct. Op. at 42.  Thus, the Court concluded, isolation has created a 
chemically different (and therefore “markedly different”) chemical from 
“native DNA” as a result of human intervention and the new chemical is 
therefore patentable subject matter.  Id.  The concurrence relied heavily on 
the same analysis of the chemistry.  Conc. at 9-10 (emphasizing that when 
DNA is fragmented in the isolation process, the fragments will have 
different chemical terminations). 
 The majority’s emphasis on the chemical nature of DNA fragments 
led it into two errors.  The majority erroneously ignored the language of the 
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claims and erroneously ignored the scientific fact that DNA fragments with 
identical chemical structure are found in nature. 
 First, the composition claims in the patents are not defined by 
chemical structure.  They are defined by function.  Patent ‘282, claim 1, for 
example, reaches any chemical that “codes for a BRCA1 polypeptide” (or 
any fragment of that polypeptide).  A-597-98, 19:41-48; 21:1-5 (“The term 
polypeptide … does not refer to a specific length”).  Multiple chemicals with 
different structures and covalent bonds broken in different places are 
included in the claims.  A-597, 19:37-40 (includes “all allelic variations”), 
id. 53-55 (“polynucleotide compositions…may be chemically or 
biochemically modified”); A-599, 24:19-21 (nucleic acid sequence need 
only be 60% similar to claimed sequence); id. 24:60 (polypeptide need only 
be 30% similar “with a naturally occurring protein”).  Indeed, the many 
different chemicals described in each claim of the patent have nothing in 
common (and nothing to distinguish them from most of the rest of the 
genome) except that they serve a particular function, i.e. they encode a 
particular protein or a fragment of the protein.  And that function (and the 
chemical differences) are created by nature, not by Myriad.  For the majority 
to therefore find that function is irrelevant or of peripheral relevance, see Ct. 
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Op. at 44; Conc. at 18, to the claims in this case is an error in claim 
construction. 
 Second, DNA fragments identical to those claimed in the patents 
appear in the body.  Nature breaks the covalent bonds that hold together the 
full chromosome, creating two or more fragments.  This occurs every time 
gametes are produced during the normal process of meiotic recombination as 
well as during the cellular process by which cells make copies of 
themselves.  It also occurs naturally when DNA experiences a double strand 
break (which then is often repaired).  Wolf-Dietrich Heyer et al., Holliday 
Junctions in the Eukaryotic Nucleus: Resolution in Sight, 28 Trends in 
Biochemical Sciences 548 (2003); see also Robyn L. Maher et al., 
Coordination of DNA Replication and Recombination Activities in the 
Maintenance of Genomic Stability, J. of Cellular Biochemistry 
(forthcoming), available at 
http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1002/jcb.23211/abstract. 
 The entire fetal and maternal genome can also be found in short 
fragments in maternal plasma.  Y.M. Dennis Lo et al., Maternal Plasma 
DNA Sequencing Reveals the Genome-Wide Genetic and Mutational Profile 
of the Fetus, 2 Science Translational Medicine 61ra91 (2010).  Thus, all of 
the fragments that make up the BRCA1/2 genes can be found in natural 
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maternal blood with the covalent bonds having been broken and the same 
chemical terminations as in Myriad’s claimed isolated BRCA1/2 DNA.  Id. 
 And, DNA fragments, including fragments of the BRCA1/2 genes, 
can be found in the blood of those suffering from cancer.  Maurice Stroun, et 
al., Isolation and Characterization of DNA from the Plasma of Cancer 
Patients, 23 Eur. J. Cancer Clin. Oncol. 707 (1987).  Again, covalent bonds 
have been broken and terminations altered in nature, creating fragments 
similar to or identical to the BRCA1/2 genes. Under the analysis of the 
majority, the fragments in all of these circumstances are different chemicals 
from the full chromosome.  Even if true, that fact is irrelevant.  The relevant 
fact is that multiple fragments of the chromosomes/genes exist in nature - 
i.e. they are products of nature. 
To the extent the Court was suggesting that Myriad has patented only 
two of the fragments, those represented as the BRCA1 and BRCA2 genes, it 
erred.  The patents themselves claim all fragments (and variations) of those 
genes/chemicals.  E.g., A-597, 19:1-19, 41-48; A-600, 25:36-37; A-664, 
claim 1.  The patents use open transitional phrases and thus claim any 
fragment of DNA that can code for any fragment of a BRCA1/2 polypeptide.  
Id.  In addition, certain claims specifically reach smaller fragments of DNA.  
Conc. at 15. 
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 To the extent the majority considered the existence of the multiple 
DNA fragments that exist in the body and concluded they were different 
from those patented by Myriad or are patentable because the scientist 
determined the length or composition of the isolated fragment, it also erred.  
See, e.g., Ct. Op. at 45-46; Conc. at 22-23 (rejecting the magic microscope 
argument because it, unlike the scientist, cannot choose where to make a 
break).   Either view misapprehends the isolation process. 
 In isolating a gene, DNA is removed from the cell and then 
fragmented.  In the terms of the majority, covalent bonds are broken and 
terminations altered, creating new chemical structures.  The scientist, 
however, does not decide or control the size or composition of the 
fragments/chemicals.  She does not decide where the covalent bonds should 
be broken or what the terminations should look like at the 3’ and 5’ ends.  
Indeed, if a scientist were to isolate the DNA of a person on Monday, and 
then do so again on Tuesday, it is likely the fragments would have a 
different size and composition.  Many fragments are likely to include a 
portion of the BRCA1/2 gene and a portion of the adjacent DNA.  These 
fragments are of random length and composition. Bruce Alberts et al., 
Molecular Biology of the Cell Ch. 8 (4th ed. 2002); Robert L. Nussbaum et 
al., Thompson and Thompson Genetics in Medicine Ch. 4 (7th ed. 2007); 
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Harvey Lodish et al., Molecular Cell Biology Ch. 7-8 (4th ed. 2000); Joseph 
Sambrook et al., Molecular Cloning: A Laboratory Manual (3rd ed. 2000). 
In addition, scientists performing isolation generally do not 
chemically stitch the fragments back together to form longer segments, such 
as an entire gene.  Sequencing generally relies on computers to recreate the 
gene sequence without creating a molecule or chemical that is an entire 
gene.  Id.  Thus, the process of determining a gene’s sequence does not rely 
on reassembling the gene in the laboratory. 
 In short, the chromosomal fragments/chemicals in the bottom of 
Myriad’s test tubes are no more the result of human decision-making than 
the fragments/chemicals created when there is a naturally-occurring double 
strand break or in the blood of pregnant women or cancer patients.  And, the 
fragments in all of those situations will be identical to the sequences claimed 
by Myriad’s patents at least some of the time.  Even more, the undisputed 
evidence in this case is that fragments of the BRCA1/2 genes as short as 15 
nucleotides can be found throughout the human genome.  A-7017-21; 7228-
30.  Thus a scientist isolating an entirely different chromosome, in order to 
sequence an entirely different gene, is likely to create a 15-nucleotide 
fragment identical in chemical composition to a 15-nucleotide fragment 
from BRCA1/2.  Perhaps most importantly, the scientist could not avoid this 
 7
result.  If the majority’s analysis is correct, the scientist isolating any human 
gene cannot take steps to ensure that she will not infringe Myriad’s patents 
because some of the fragments/chemicals that occur may be identical to 
those that are fragments of the BRCA1/2 genes. 1 
 To the extent the Court held that the full genes and the fragments are 
all patentable because they have a different chemical structure from anything 
found in nature, it was simply incorrect.  To the extent the concurrence was 
relying on the fragments having a different structure from anything found in 
nature, its reliance was misplaced.  And, if the claims cover, even in part, 
any product of nature, they must be found invalid. 
 The majority overlooked these facts because it relied on scientific 
facts and/or arguments that were not supported by the record.  See, e.g., 
Boone v. Chiles, 35 U.S. 177, 178 (1836) (“By the rules of an appellate 
court, it can act on no evidence which was not before the court below, or 
receive any paper that was not used at the hearing.”); Regents of University 
of Michigan v. Genesearch, L.L.C., 81 Fed. Appx. 335, 338 (Fed. Cir. 2003) 
(the Federal Circuit Court of Appeals “does not review evidence or 
arguments that were not presented to the trial court in the first instance. The 
                                                 
1 This is not a § 112 issue.  Ct. Op. at 47.  Instead it is relevant because if 
any of the compositions claimed are products of nature, then the entire claim 
is invalid.  
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scope of appellate review in this court is limited to the record established in 
the proceedings before the trial court.”) 
Myriad did not refer to covalent bonds in the district court.  The 
patents do not use the term to describe the backbone of the chromosome or 
gene or chromosome fragment. The claims have no express limitations to 
gene fragments that have had their covalent bonds broken by man, and such 
an inherent limitation is not supported by the specification, the file history, 
or any argument Myriad made at any time in this matter.  The term does not 
appear in any of Myriad’s briefs or declarations presented to the district 
court.2  Myriad did not refer to the relevance or importance of breaking a 
covalent bond.   
Similarly, the patents do not refer to “hydroxyl” termination points 
(Conc. at 9) existing after isolation.  Myriad did not use the word hydroxyl 
in any brief or declaration presented to the district court.  The patents do not 
refer to “phosphate” or “phosphodiester” in describing termination points 
existing after isolation.  Myriad did not argue that after isolation, BRCA1/2 
or any of the fragments contained different termination points.  Myriad did 
                                                 
2 Appellants did refer to covalent bonds in their appellate briefs as part of a 
descriptive string of terms.  Brief for Appellants at 36; Reply Brief at 17.  
None of the citations to the record in these briefs referred to covalent bonds. 
For example, the first citation at p. 36 was to the definition of “isolation” in 
one of the patents.  That definition makes no reference to covalent bonds. 
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not argue that it determines the length or composition of fragments created 
during isolation or that it chemically stitches together an entire gene.  
Myriad did not argue that fragments of the BRCA1/2 genes, either 
covalently bonded to adjoining DNA or not, do not exist in the body.  
Myriad’s argument has been that removing the full genes from all bodily 
material and removing them from the body makes them patentable because 
they have been removed from all adjacent chemicals, whether those to which 
they were bonded covalently or otherwise, and that because they have been 
entirely removed from the body, they can be used. 
Had Myriad made the factual assertions and legal arguments on which 
the majority relies, plaintiffs would have put responses in the record.  Those 
responses would have agreed that covalent bonds are broken as part of the 
isolation process but placed that concession in the context of the covalent 
bonds that are broken in the body (and the composition of the resultant 
fragments) and the covalent bonds that are broken in the isolation process 
(and the identical composition of the resultant fragments).  That submission 
would have established that the patented items are still products of nature.  
Given that Myriad did not do so, plaintiffs did not have that opportunity.  If 
the panel believes this case would benefit from declarations as to these 
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responsive facts, plaintiffs would be happy to provide those declarations.  
Fed. R. App. P. 10(e)(3).3 
 Because the majority premised its conclusions on the chemical 
alterations caused during the isolation process and either did not consider (or 
simply got wrong) the question of whether the altered chemicals are 
“markedly different” from chemicals found in nature, the majority erred.  
Even if the chemical alterations deemed significant by the majority are 
significant, they result in chemicals that are not markedly different from and 
are at times identical to those found in nature. They are thus not patentable 
subject matter. 
II. THE COURT FAILED TO ACKNOWLEDGE UNDISPUTED FACTS 
THAT GIVE TWO OTHER PLAINTIFFS STANDING. 
 
 The panel found that plaintiff Dr. Ostrer has standing.  Ct. Op. at 35.  
The undisputed record reflects that Dr. Ostrer is a member of the 
organizational plaintiff American College of Medical Genetics (ACMG).  A-
                                                 
3 Some of the articles or books cited in this motion were referenced in the 
trial court; others were not.  To the extent they were not previously 
discussed, they are included in the motion to respond to the new facts and/or 
arguments raised by the majority.  Plaintiffs have cited only well-established 
scientific evidence in learned treatises.  However, if this Court views these 
citations as expanding the record, it has authority to do so. Dakota Indus., 
Inc. v. Dakota Sportswear, Inc., 988 F.2d 61, 63 (8th Cir. 1993) (appellate 
court can supplement a record) (citing Turk v. United States, 429 F.2d 1327, 
1329 (8th Cir. 1970)); United States v. Aulet, 618 F.2d 182, 187 (2d Cir. 
1980) (same); Castle v. Cohen, 840 F.2d 173, 180 n. 12 (3d Cir. 1988) 
(same). 
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1463.  The undisputed record reflects that gene patenting is germane to 
ACMG’s purpose.  A-1300.  Pursuant to well-established Supreme Court 
law, ACMG therefore has organizational standing.  Warth v. Selden, 422 
U.S. 490, 511 (1975). 
 In addition, the panel asserted that “[n]one of the plaintiffs besides 
Drs. Kazazian, Ganguly, and Ostrer, allege that Myriad directed any letters 
or other communications regarding its patents at them.”  Ct. Op. at 20.  That 
is simply incorrect.  Plaintiff Ellen Matloff’s declaration makes clear that 
she personally had conversations with Myriad in which she was told by 
Myriad that she and geneticists at Yale would violate Myriad’s patents if 
they performed the tests that she wanted to perform.  A-34-5, 1553.  The 
Court held that a plaintiff had standing if Myriad directed “any … 
communications regarding its patents at them.”  Under that standard, Ms. 
Matloff has standing.4 
 
 
                                                 
4 Plaintiffs/appellees believe that the majority made other errors with respect 
to standing and the patentability of the composition claims.  Plaintiffs do not 
waive those contentions.  However, in this petition, plaintiffs argue issues 
raised by the majority opinion for the first time. 
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